This paper aims to pay tribute to Figal’s comprehensive and innovative analysis of the artwork and beauty, while challenging both his realist position on the immediacy of meaning and his monist stance that reduces sublimity to beauty. To enquire into the origin of aesthetic feelings and sense, and thus, to break the hermeneutic circle, we first trace the origin of this reduction to the reception of Burke’s concept of the sublime by Mendelssohn and Kant. We then recur to Husserl and (...) Dufrenne to trace the origin of the sense of the feeling of sublimity in the realm of affectivity or sensuousness. This genesis takes place in passive experience, where we identify an excess of sensuous sense over categorial meaning that is constitutive of the affective sense that our bodily sensations give to hyletic material. It is argued that this sensuous excess evokes a sublime experience in the phenomenological sense, involving an affective and disruptive bodily experience and an endless process of sense formation. Affective or sensuous sense is thus an event that irreversibly affects the bodily surface. To elucidate this phenomenon, we draw on the theoretical framework of Breton and Bataille, positing it as a form-transgressive ‘convulsive’ sublime, which we then illustrate in the architectural works of Tschumi and Eisenman. In short, we have retrieved the origin of aesthetic experience and redefined the feeling of the sublime as a phenomenological ‘convulsive’ sublimity. (shrink)

The five books of Artemidorus of Ephesus’ Oneirocritica (c. second century CE) constitute the largest collection of divinatory dream-interpretations to survive from Graeco-Roman antiquity. This article examines Artemidorus’ contribution to longstanding medico-philosophical debates over the ontological and epistemic character of such dreams. As with wider Mediterranean traditions concerning premonitory dreams, Greeks and Romans popularly understood them as phenomena with origins exterior to the dreamer (e.g. a visitation of a god). Presocratic and Hippocratic thinkers, however, initiated an effort to bring at (...) least some dream events within the body as interior processes of a physical soul, a bodily turn which ultimately engendered a split in thinking about the possibility and scope of prophetic and diagnostic dreams (e.g. Hippocrates Regimen 4, Aristotle On Prophecy in Dreams, Rufus of Ephesus, and Galen). Here, I examine the way that Artemidorus meant the Oneirocritica to address seriously questions about the origins of dreams and the powers of empirical science in two, related ways. We will see that his defense of oneirocriticism as a techne unfolds along two main axes. First, Artemidorus constructs a necessary veneer of scientific credibility by mobilizing the tropes and organizational strategies characteristic of contemporary technical literature. Secondly, he anchors that authority upon a materialist account of prophetic dreams as “semiotic movements of the soul.” As Price, S. 1986. “The Future of Dreams: From Freud to Artemidorus.” Past & Present 113: 3–36 and Harris-McCoy, D. 2012. Artemidorus’ Oneirocritica: Text, Translation, and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press observed, this explicit commitment to an empirical method of dream-interpretation resembles that of the Hellenistic medical ‘sect’ known as ‘Empiricists,’ who eschewed interest in theoretical etiology in favor of observation, comparison, and compilation of symptoms and outcomes. Pushing beyond similarity, I argue that Artemidorus not only deployed this method to defend empirically grounded accounts of dream-divination (cf. Cicero De div. 1), but endeavored to show that such a scientific method can be used to stabilize and corral productively the potentially infinite number of interpretations any dream-sign might bear without recourse to an underlying, causal theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Search for the Absent God: Tradition and Modernity in Religious Understanding. By WILLIAM J. HILL, O.P., MARY CATHERINE HILKERT, 0.P., ed. New York: Crossroad, 1992. Pp. 224. $27.50 (cloth). In presenting the fruit of a lifetime of exploration on the part of this theological craftsman of the highest merit, the editor has performed an unparalleled service. For William Hill is a clear and courageous thinker, and one (...) whose selfless editorial duties have perhaps curtailed his own writing over the years. Yet these essays make up for that, and afford younger students of theology a starting point for their reflections beyond the fads of the moment, yet seizing the challenge of contemporary proposals. His grasp of classical and of modern idiom, together with his range of reading, make him a theologians' theologian par excellence. For with his classical mentors he is concerned with conceptual coherence, yet equally anxious to respond to the anthropological perspectives of contemporary theological inquiry. Briefly characterized, the work brings Thomas Aquinas into dialogue with Heidegger and with Whitehead, using each of the latter figures to challenge an earlier " Thomistic" synthesis of the thought of Thomas Aquinas, and highlight dimensions of his theology hitherto left quite implicit. This creative recovery of medieval thought begins with an established interpretation of Aquinas's metaphysical transformation of the neoplatonized Aristotle of Avicenna: his insistence that esse {existing ) precedes essence (or possibility). The identification of God as that One in whom essence and existing are identical sets the stage for Hill's explicitly theological treatment of free persons, by analogy with the " persons " of the divine triunity: " each divine person ' posits ' the others as over and against himself and thereby posits himself in his hypostatic identity. What all this bases itself upon is the understanding that the Christian revelation of freedom as radically constituting personhood enables it to function as a category which surmounts the Greek dichotomizing of reality into contingency and necessity " (117). If the identification of existing with essence in God confronts Heidegger's critique of " ontology," Hill's use of classical trinitarian thought to suggest a fruitful distinction in human creatures between nature and freedom allows him at once to correct the caricature of Aquinas proffered by process theologians as "classical theism," and 521 522 BOOK REVIEWS also to profit by their criticisms of the use of hellenistic categories like impassibility in divinity. "The key... lies in the mystery of freedom. Abstractly, freedom is a property of nature, but its exercise is the pre· rogative of person as the existential instantiation of nature. The person viewed ontologically (as subject of the act of existing) thus determines itself though its nature to be the sort of person it is, viewed psychologi· cally and historically" (127). Finite natures need to negotiate all sorts of causal influences in effecting such a determination of themselves; not so " an infinite nature whose freedom is transcendent." Yet when that One freely determines itself to be source and goal of all, and espe· cially of rational creatures (cf. Summa Theologiae 1.2 Prol.), then " that choice is one of willing to be constituted, personally and so relationally, and in this sense to be determined, by other free beings" (127). So the God who (in Aquinas' idiom) is not "really related" to the world in the sense of enduring (in Hill's words) "passive influx," nonetheless freely relates to intentional creatures in such a way as to be responsive to their freedom. So his response to Moltmann's conten· tion that God suffers " in his very deity " is an explicitly Christological one: "first, that God remains immutable and impassible in his own intrinsic godhead, so that his genuine love for creatures cannot entail suffering within divinity as such; but second, that God does choose to enter personally and relationally into the heart of humankind's suffering in his transcendentally free and loving response to it. God truly suffers... in and through his humanity which is one with the humanity of all men and women" (162). If this resolution sounds "classical," it is, both in its concern for conceptual coherence and for bringing out the radical implications of doctrines like that of Chalcedon... (shrink)

1. The use of the imperfect τικτε ‘was the mother of’, with τíκτουσα; νίκων, ο νικντες; διδος is well known, and no doubt correctly explained. Reference is frequently made to Virgil's quem dat Sidonia Dido, but δίδου seems not to be used, no doubt because it is so extensively used in the sense of ‘offered’. In T. 7. 56. 3 περιεγíγνοντο seems to be a substitute for νíκων, ‘were victorious’; cf. φερε in Find. O. 10 , 74 ‘was prizewinner’ —the (...) other winners all have an aorist. So too Pyth. 3. 44. (shrink)

: According to a consensus of psycho-physiological and philosophical theories, color sensations (or qualia) are generated in a cerebral "space" fed from photon-photoreceptor interaction (producing "metamers") in the retina of the eye. The resulting "space" has three dimensions: hue (or chroma), saturation (or "purity"), and brightness (lightness, value or intensity) and (in some versions) is further structured by primitive or landmark "colors"—usually four, or six (when white and black are added to red, yellow, green and blue). It has also been (...) proposed that there are eleven semantic universals—labeling the previous six plus the "intermediaries" of orange, pink, brown, purple, and gray. There are many versions of this consensus, but they all aim to provide ontological, epistemological and semantic blueprints for the brute fact of the reality of color ordained by Nature (evolution). In contrast to this consensus, we have argued that "seeing color" is not a matter of light waves impacting on our eyes, producing sensations to be categorized and labeled in the "color space" in the brain. While electrochemical events may unproblematically be regarded as the causal precondition for seeing color, the reception of sensations in "the color space" as semantically labeled natural categories, kinds, or information, is a "just so" story: it is Wittgenstein's beetle in a box. In contrast we consider that the authority of this consensus might better be regarded not as the result of the truth-tracking of nature, but as the sociohistorical outcome of philosophical presuppositions, scientific theories, experimental practices, technological apparatus, and their feed forward into the lifeworld. The question we shall therefore explore is whether, or to what extent, we ourselves are changed, as the conditions of production of color science change. Thus we are doing a kind of anthropology at two levels: of color science itself (and its effect on our own lifeworld), and of those studied by the "anthropology of color". As befits this stance we are agnostic about the theoretical entities of color science (cf. van Fraassen 2001), and within this new context, we propose to cross-cut object-and-subject, organism-and-environment (the bedrock of color science) in socio-historical ways. Our approach is in part inspired by, but not the same as, that of Gibson, in that we wish to pursue the notion of "social affordances" (Burmudez 1995). We suggest that color has become a naturalization through science-based technologies, which, through praxes and materializations, have become the perceptual and cultural entities that structure experience and understanding in the lifeworld. It is this naturalization that we shall refer to and characterize as "the historically inflected exosomatic organ". Consequently we shall explore the historical ontology of "color" without assuming an underlying biological constant (Dupré 2001). In part 1 we show the flimsiness of the evidence for the three dimensions of color, borrowed from physics, and fine-tuned to a "standard observer" (a "spectral creature" with a phenomenal "color space"). In part 2 we address the structuring of hue through the development of color circles and color spaces. This is followed by a review of the evidence for unique hues. Again the evidence is shown to be flimsy. We then show that an isolated domain of color is a particular kind of model, not a "natural given". In part 3, after reviewing what is referred to as "the isomorphy thesis," we discuss the exemplary case study of Berlin and Kay (1969). This illustrates the pull of stadial models presupposed by their evolutionary theory of color language. The Berlin and Kay paradigm proposes that American English color terms are incorrigible and can provide the universal metalanguage. We conclude by presenting an alternative account, namely that we ourselves are changed as the conditions of production of color science change. We argue that it is better to regard "seeing-color" as a historically inflected exosomatic organ that provides social affordances for those trained to grasp them. (shrink)

The structuralist Andre-Weil–Claude-Levi-Strauss transformation formula (CF), initially applied to kinship systems, mythology, ritual, artistic design and architecture, was rightfully criticized for its rationalism and tendency to reduce complex transformations to analogical structures. I present a revised non-mathematical revision of the CF, a general transformation formula (rCF) applicable to networks of complementary semantic binaries in conceptual value-fields of culture, including comparative religion and mythology, ritual, art, literature and philosophy. The rCF is a rule-guided formula for combinatorial conceptualizing in non-representational, presentational mythopoetics (...) and other cultural symbolizations. I consider poststructuralist category-theoretic and algebraic mathematical interpretations of the CF as themselves only mathematical analogies, which serve to stimulate further revision of the logic model of the rCF. The rCF can be used in hypothesis-making to advance understanding of the evolution and prehistory of human symbolic behaviour in cultural space, philosophical ontologies and categories, definitions and concepts in art, religion, psychotherapy, and other cultural-value forms. (shrink)

Molinism entails that God cannot actualize just any possible world because God has no control over what counterfactuals of freedom (CFs) are true. This fact confronts the Molinist with a dilemma. If God has a plan for the course of history logically antecedent to his cognizance of the true CFs, then God would have been implausibly lucky if any actualizable world corresponded to his plan. If, on the other hand, God did not have a plan for the course of history (...) antecedent to his cognizance of the true CFs, then Molinism is incommensurate with a meticulous view of providence. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical TraditionSarah B. PomeroyMadeleine M. Henry. Prisoner of History: Aspasia of Miletus and Her Biographical Tradition. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 201 pp. Cloth, $29.95.Pericles declared that the best women are those who are known neither for praise nor blame (Thuc. 2.45.2). Despite the invisibility of respectable women in fifth-century Athens, skeletal biographies including the names of (...) their fathers, husbands, sons, and, occasionally, daughters can be constructed. A vignette in Plutarch or a private oration may flesh out the story. Although etiquette discouraged giving the name of a respectable woman while she was alive, she is named in her epitaph. The historian can narrate the entire life of such a woman in a single paragraph.The most famous woman in classical Athens, the only one who rates an entry in the Oxford Classical Dictionary2 (Oxford, 1970) and could be the subject of a full-length biography, is the hetaira Aspasia. Yet even a book devoted to Aspasia who is named in multiple sources including comedy, philosophy, history, and biography fills only 130 pages of text, most of which treat post-classical traditions about Aspasia rather than the life of the woman herself.Chapter 1, a mere nine pages about “Aspasia in Greek History,” is the only part of this book that discusses Aspasia’s actual biography. Henry accepts P. J. Bicknell’s suggestion that Aspasia was an upper-class Milesian whose older sister was married to the Alcibiades who became the grandfather of the notorious Alcibiades (AC 51 [1982] 240–50). An orphan, when she was an adolescent Aspasia came to Athens with her sister and brother-in-law. If this reconstruction is accurate, we must wonder why her brother-in-law did not secure a proper marriage for his young sister-in-law, rather than permit her to become Pericles’ concubine, but perhaps an alliance with the first man in Athens was attractive to the elder Alcibiades. Furthermore he had no legal obligation to dower his sister-in-law. Estate planning and heirship strategies probably influenced Pericles, on his part (cf. Plut. Pericles 16.3–4), for he already had legitimate sons born from his first wife and had no need of another full-fledged marriage. Despite the affection with which Pericles treated Aspasia (Plut. Pericles 24.5–6), he does not seem to have made any arrangements for her future after his death. Lysicles, in turn, who is reported to have married Aspasia, probably regarded a connection with her as a “dynastic marriage” linking himself in this way with the deceased [End Page 648] Pericles. Aspasia made the best of her situation, attempting to bridge the gap between notoriety and respectability: she seems to have confined her attentions to only one man at a time and bore sons whose parentage was never doubted.The very existence of Poristes (“Provider”), the son of Aspasia and Lysicles, is questioned by Henry (43) who suggests that word was used of Aspasia herself. I think it is at least as likely that Lysicles chose his son’s name as his own epithet to refer to his fatherly concern for the Athenians, much the way that the names of Themistocles’ children testify to their father’s political interests. Furthermore, although Henry does not refer to the larger sweep of women’s history, Aspasia lived during the Peloponnesian War, a watershed in the history of Athenian women, when on account of the absence of men at war and the desertion of slaves, the luxury of secluding respectable women had to yield to harsh necessity (see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves [New York, 1975] 66–67). Therefore the traditions that Aspasia lived in the same household with Pericles’ married sons and their wives and that she conversed with married women are believable.In chapter 2, “The Story Told by Comedy,” Henry rejects the testimony of the comic poets, found also in Plutarch (Pericles 24.5), that Aspasia ran a brothel. Yet since her concubinage is evidence of the lack of a dowry, it would have been advantageous for Aspasia to arrange... (shrink)

We further develop the mathematical theory of causal interventions, extending earlier results of Korb, Twardy, Handfield, & Oppy, (2005) and Spirtes, Glymour, Scheines (2000). Some of the skepticism surrounding causal discovery has concerned the fact that using only observational data can radically underdetermine the best explanatory causal model, with the true causal model appearing inferior to a simpler, faithful model (cf. Cartwright, (2001). Our results show that experimental data, together with some plausible assumptions, can reduce the space of viable explanatory (...) causal models to one. (shrink)

From beginning to end, the poem is literally made up of relations…[that] constitute a method of contemplation and criticism, a way of inviting the reader to think in terms of one thing in terms of another. Consider, for example, Odysseus' trip to Chryse in book 1, a passage I never read without surprise: in this tense and heavily charged world, in which everything seems to have been put into potentially violent contention, why are we given this slow and deliberate journey, (...) so heavily formulaic in texture? The answer is that this is a ritual of reconciliation, a kind of healing, which will receive its most ample performance at the great movement in book 24 when Achilles and Priam share their sorrows. A movement begins here that will run throughout the poem.It is by such an art of arrangement, by placing one thing against another, that Homer criticizes the world of book 1 with which he began; not, as we expect of a writer today, by elaborating competitive languages of motives and value but by ordering his materials into patterns of experience that teach the reader something different from anything the material itself seems to say.1 In a way the poem, as a whole thus has the form of argument; not, of course, argument in the ratiocinative sense of a thesis supported by propositions, from which it can be said to proceed by the rules of logic or the laws of probability, but argument as an activity of critical engagement, a definition of resources and a testing of limits, that results in the creation of a new position taken by the writer and offered to the reader. An argument goes on in the text, but its method is closer to that of music than debate.· 1. Cf. Cedric H. Whitman, Homer and the Heroic Tradition chap. 6, for another view of the ways that formula and image combine.James B. White is a professor in the law school, the college, and the committee on the ancient Mediterranean world at the University of Chicago. He is the author of The Legal Imagination, Constitutional Criminal Procedure, and a book on rhetoric and culture, from which the present article is drawn. (shrink)

Gerald Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World is refreshingly ambitious. It seems to me that our field today is a little too eager to “[stay] on the surface, philosophically speaking” (Rawls 1999, p. 395; cf. 2005, p. 10). However, the scope of Gaus’s ambition complicates the critic’s task. When a philosophical work aims to present something as grand as a “theory of freedom and morality,” it seems plausible to (...) think that the appropriate unit of analysis is the whole rather than any of its elements. This is especially so in the case of a book like Gaus’s, where the author’s philosophical acumen is well-matched to its objectives. Despite Gaus’s claims to be a fox (xiv),Numbers in parentheses without further citation information refer to Gaus’s The Order of Public Reason.The Order of Public Reason is a hedgehoggy work.A full-on assessment of Gaus’s book hence lies well beyond the scope of a single essay. My aims are consequently. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 475 whereas in some texts Aquinas explicitly teaches that the higher senses of vision and hearing are the ones that mainly (praecipue, principaliter) lead to aesthetic experience.t5 Moreover, the statement that only in the thirteenth century was the question of the distinction between the higher and lower senses explicitly raised (p. l13f.), is true only if the author meant to exclude the pre-medieval or patristic as well (...) as the ancient period of philosophy.16 Finally, there is one technical weakness in this book that cannot be left unmentioned. The overwhelming majority of references are not to the original medieval texts treated and/or quoted in the three-volume edition, but to the number of volume and page in that edition. Thus the reader must be both familiar with French and in possession of the original three-volume work, or remain hopelessly frustrated every time he wishes to consult the original texts or at least know which texts are being mentioned. Yet, if one knows French, he does not need the English translation; and if he is also fortunate enough to have access to the original three-volume version, he will not need the abridged version of the original work at all. For this reason, should there be a second edition of this translation, the references should be changed from the l~tudes to the original medieval works. Although the negative remarks are more lengthy in this review than the positive evaluation is, it would be a grave mistake to conclude from this that the defects outweigh the value of the book. As a matter of fact, upon finishing the reading of this translation of De Bruyne's work, this reviewer was left with the conviction that, in the final balance, the reader can only greatly benefit from this work, and we all owe gratitude to the translator for having made this highly informative work available in the English language. FRANCIS J. KOVACH University of Oklahoma 1~ Summ. theol. I-II,27,1,ad 3; In Psalm. 44,2. ~6 Cf. Plato, Hipp. maL 298 A; Gorg. 474 D; Leg. XII, 961 D; Aristotle, De an. III,3, 429a 3; Augustine, De lib. arb. II,7, 16-19; 14,38; De ord. II,ll, etc. Le origini del metodo analitico: il Cinquecento. By Angelo Crescini. (Udine: Del Bianco, 1965. Published by the Istituto di Filosofia, Facnlt~ di Lettere e Filosofia of the Universit~ degli Studi di Trieste. Pp. 340. L 5,000) Professor Crescini has certainly picked a topic of great interest upon which to write. Recent students of Renaissance logic such as N. W. Gilbert, V. Mufioz Delgado, W. Ong, G. Papuli, W. Risse, and C. Vasoli have pointed out the vitality and significance associated with the development of the logical thought of the period. The general question of methodology has produced an enormous scholarly literature in recent years,I but much remains to be done before we fully understand how various methodologies have evolved and what relation philosophical discussions of method have had to the actual practice of science. Therefore, it would be most desirable to have a 1 For further information see Laurens Laudan, "Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach: A Bibliographical Review," History of Science 7 (1968), 1-63. 476 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY detailed, comprehensive, and accurate study of the evolution of analytic method during the sixteenth century, particularly in view of the significance taken on by such a methodology with the 'rise of modern science'. With such a background in view the reviewer comes to this volume in anticipation of being generally enlightened on various matters. Unfortunately, Crescini's book is on the whole disappointing, although nearly everyone will find the odd bit of information of which he was not previously aware. It definitely does not, however, establish a solid foundation for later studies. The book is organized into three principal parts, dealing with the development of the analytic method in logic (pp. 21-188), in the natural sciences (pp. 189-284), and in mathematics (vv. 285-328). The first section treats discussions of the topic among writers on logical subject, under which heading are included 'humanist' logicians such as... (shrink)

In nearly every modern society, patriotism, as a form of love related to one’s homeland, possesses its own specific semantic colours. This is so due to historical and cultural differences between nations. In recent debates about the condition of patriotism in Poland as well as political disputes, patriotism is often mentioned as, alongside with others, a civilian virtue. According to various research on public opinions, patriotism is recognised as one of the most distinctive characteristics of the Poles (beside religiousness and (...) resourcefulness). It is a virtue as well as an attitude which Poles manifest in various ways (from the so-called “football” patriotism to simple daily work solidly done with honesty and diligence for the good of one’s homeland). This paper presents a conception of patriotism from the Catholic Social Teaching viewpoint. This teaching, taking into account both Divine Revelation and past experiences of mankind (the socalled “hermeneutical arch” of Moral Theology, perceives the phenomenon of patriotism in a wider context such as nation, homeland, country and international community). The Church insists on upbringing and education of love towards one’s homeland, while distances its teaching clearly and decisively from racial prejudice and hypernationalism (cf. Ad Gentes, 15). (shrink)

This article consisting of four points, shows the subject of multiple relationships between the realities of politics, ethics and the Catholic Church. The issue was presented on the basis of the writings and speeches of Joseph Ratzinger, the current Pope Benedict XVI. Article begins with a presentation of the relationship between politics and ethics as seen in historical perspective. The second section presents the so-called „political ethics” of the first Christian communities in the light of the indications contained in some (...) of the New Testament writings (cf. 1 Thess; 1 Peter) being the basis for the Christian way of acting in the area of policy. The third section indicates some realities like: progress, science and freedom – considered sometimes as an unquestioned idols and that`s why named once by Ratzinger „myth of modernity” – as a threat to connectivity between politics and ethics. The fourth section discusses the teaching of the Catholic Church on politics and the need for its ethical practice. In addition it contains some concrete proposals of Ratzinger that can be used in contemporary debates on the fundamental values of a democratic state in contemporary pluralistic societies. It also refers to Pope Benedict XVI appeals for more ethics of politics. (shrink)

Introduction Research supports the efficacy of both a remedial consent procedure ) and a motivational consent procedure for improving recall of informed consent to research. Although these strategies were statistically superior to standard consent, effects were modest and not clinically significant. This study examines a combined incentivised consent and CF procedure that simplifies the cognitive task and increases motivation to learn consent information.Methods We randomly assigned 104 individuals consenting to an unrelated host study to a consent as usual condition or (...) an incentivised CF condition . All participants were told they would be quizzed on their consent recall following their baseline assessment and at 4 monthly follow-ups. ICF participants were also informed that they would earn $5 for each correct answer and receive CF as needed.Results Quiz scores in the two conditions did not differ at the first administration ; however, ICF scores were significantly higher at each subsequent administration .Conclusions The ICF procedure increased consent recall from 72% to 83%, compared with the CAU condition in which recall decreased from 69% to 59%. This supports the statistical and clinical utility of a combined remedial and motivational consent procedure for enhancing recall of study information and human research protections. (shrink)

The form has lately caused controversy. It is traditionally interpreted as poetic for but O. Skutsch has denied that iota could be lost in this way, pointing out that instead it could be a correctly formed future cf. with a root ending in the laryngeal. M. Campbell rejects this, and rightly claims that ApoUonius borrowed the line from the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo 528.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, 337–90 B.C.Everett L. WheelerSheila L. Ager. Interstate Arbitration in the Greek World, 337–90 B.C.Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1996. xvii + 579 pp. Cloth, $70, £55 (foreign). (Hellenistic Culture and Society, 18)Sheila L. Ager's massive—and impressive—volume on Hellenistic interstate arbitration rides the new wave of scholarly interest in the politically fragmented but cosmopolitan Hellenistic period. Cosmopolitanism in many (...) periods (including the present post–Cold War era) has fostered political internationalism—schemes of world government, federal unions, and mechanisms for peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts. Although the Hellenistic age enjoyed little respite from war, some scholars have hailed Greek arbitration as a model for modern imitation.A brief survey of previous scholarship on arbitration will place Ager's work in perspective. Concepts of law and internationalism dominated earlier work. Some believed that arbitration as judicial practice could be studied without distinguishing public from private or internal from interstate cases: e.g., E. Sonne, De arbitris externis, quos Graeci adhibuerunt ad lites et intestinas et [End Page 642] peregrinas componendas, quaestiones epigraphicae (1888); E. de Ruggiero, L'arbitrato pubblico in relazione col privato presso i Romani (1893); A. Steinwenter, Die Streitbeendigung durch Urteil, Schiedsspruch und Vergleich nach griechischem Recht (1925). For internationalists establishment of a permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 1899 elicited a flood of scholarly interest: Greek arbitration now had contemporary relevance: e.g., W.Westermann, CJ 2 (1906–7) 197–211; L. Matthaei, CQ 2 (1908) 241–64; A. Raeder, L'arbitraire internationale chez les Hellenes (1912), published by the Nobel Institute; M. Tod, International Arbitration amongst the Greeks (1913); cf. his Sidelights on Greek History (1932) 39–68. Victor Bérard (always "Berard" in Ager) remained a voice of cynicism crying in the wilderness (De Arbitro inter Liberas Graecorum Civitates, 1894): Greeks resorted to arbitration after exhaustion in war or accepted a settlement only until a later opportunity for reopening the case arose. Study of interstate arbitration, dormant after Tod, revived with Luigi Piccirilli's corpus of Greek cases ca. 740–338 B.C.: Gli arbitrati interstatali greci (Pisa [not Florence, as Ager 578], 1973). Seven years later, A. J. Marshall reassessed Roman arbitrations in the East and accommodation of Greek practice (ANRW II.13 [1980] 626–61), on which E. S. Gruen expanded: The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (1984) 96–131.Certainly more cases of arbitration/mediation are now known. Ager's study includes 171 instances for 337–90 B.C., with an appendix of 40 cases from texts too fragmentary to judge their contents accurately or instances failing to meet her criteria for inclusion as arbitration/mediation. In comparison, Ruggiero assembled a Roman corpus of 65 cases (both public and private, 191 B.C.– A.D. 282/4); Raeder, 81 Greek cases (ca. 740–ca. 100 B.C.; Tod, 82 Greek cases (ca. 740–early first cent. B.C.); and Piccirilli, 61 Greek cases (ca. 740–338 B.C.), besides 19 cases from mythological sources. But numbers easily deceive (cf. Ager 19–20): new epigraphical discoveries alone would assure greater numbers. Moreover, whereas Ruggiero, Raeder, and Tod confined their catalogues to epigraphical texts, Piccirilli and Ager include literary testimonia and a broader definition of "arbitration":, a formal judicial procedure involving selection of third–party judges to evaluate publicly presented oral and written testimony; mediation (σύλλυσις), a third party's reconciliation of disputants; and, for Ager (xiv), even "voluntary compromise."Ager's volume, a revised dissertation (University of British Columbia), continues Piccirilli's corpus: thus its initial terminus is 337 B.C.; the concluding terminus, 90 B.C., is conceded to be arbitrary. The texts follow chronological order (as opposed to Tod's regional arrangement). Only interstate cases involving Greeks as either disputant or arbiter are included, and inconsistency for inclusion is confessed: not all cases are in her view historical (i.e., no. 93, Heraclea's attempted mediation between Rome and Antiochus III), and her generous definition of "arbitration" can involve subjectivity (e.g., no. 23 [Delphi]: dikastai in a very fragmentary text qualifies it as an arbitration document; cf... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion and Philosophy from Plato's Phaedo to the Chaldaean Oracles PHILIP MERLAN A FEW YEARSAGO another of the so-called Orphic tablets was found? Like the previously known ones~it is an instruction for the deceased--it tells him what he will find in the beyond and how he is to act to secure for himself a blessed afterlife. As a rule the tablets differ somewhat in their wording and the newly (...) found is particularly remarkable in that the deceased, when asked by the guards of the Spring of Memory what his business here is, is instructed to answer, "I am a child of the Earth and o~octvo~5~aveOo~v~og ~ and my name is Asterios. ''~ Now, it is generally recognized that the tablets are the product of some mystery religion? The new tablet suggests that part of its initiation ceremony might have been the experience of a mock death and a mock rebirth, the latter symbolized by the assuming of a new name? XN. M. Verdelis, "XaXr~ 7eCp6~oxos raX~rls ~x r 'ApxaLoXoy~K ~ 'Er 1950-1951 (Athens, 1951), pp. 80-105, esp. pp. 99-105. 2 Their text can be found in any edition of Diels-Kranz, VS. New finds: N. M. Verdelis, '0pr162 ~,&rt*ara ~ Kpr "Ap~ca~oXo*t~x~"E~tzep~ 1953-54, Second Part (Athens, 1958), pp. 56-60. On their character (Orphic? Pythagorean?), see F. Cumont, Lex perpetua (Paris, 1944), p. 406. Which mystery religion professed these two as obviously the highest deities? One is tempted to think of the mysteries of Samothrace, as in them these two deities played a conspicuous role according to Varro, De lingua lat. V 58 (cf. B. Cardauns, Varros 'Logistoricus' iiber die G6tterverehrung [Wiirzburg, 1960], pp. 60-67). 4 dar (~po4pro~)seems to me an evident conjecture by Verdelis. See, e.g., M. P. Nilsson, Geschichte der griechischen Religion, Vol. 2 (Miinchen, 1950), pp. 223-227. 0This is the assumption of Verdelis, XaXxr ~'e,~0~oxo~ with which I agree. On baptismal names see, e.g., A Oepke, "AM~IOAAEIY~ im griechischen und hellenistischen Kult," Archiv fiir Religionswissenschaft 31 (1934), pp. 42-56, esp. 52, note 5 (den Anstoss---scil. to bestowing of a new name on the initiate--gaben wohl primitive Wiedergeburtsgedanken). It seems to me that the Pindaric lines praising him who descends to the netherworld if he had been initiated, because he ot~e ~p fllov.reXew'gu,/olSeJ,~b.&6a~orol,tlpx~p (fr. 137a Sch) are to be explained by assuming that Pindar is here alluding to the experience of mock death (~-~,ev~-~) and mock rebirth (apX~), though it remains unclear whether the initiate experienced them in his own person or was only shown something (e.g. the burial of a seed followed by its shooting into an ear) symbolizing such events. [163] 164 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY And it is only natural to suppose that the initiation ceremony was preceded by some kind of ritual purification. In one more respect the new tablet is remarkable. It is the oldest we know. It belongs to the mid-fourth century. And this means that perhaps only a few years separate it from the date of the publication of Plato's Phaedo.' Now, as everybody knows, the Phaedo has something to say on mystery religions. Socrates first explains to his friends why he is not only not afraid of death but even looking forward to it. All his life long, he says, he was a philosopher and philosophy, as he sees it, is nothing else but ~X~-c~l0ctvd,ov. And as he explains in what way philosophy is a preparation for death, he time and again uses for the description of the philosopher's way of life the word 'pure' and its cognates (Phaedo 67d-e; 69a6-e5 [~d~}aqot~,•, ~xa0a0~vog], so that in the end the philosopher's way of life can by Socrates be described as purification-obviously purification not in its ritual sense of the word but, as Socrates sees it, in its true sense. And now Socrates clinches his argument and says: And it seems indeed that the men to whom we are indebted for the institution of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant's Transcendental Deduction by Alison LaywineKatherine DunlopAlison Laywine. Kant's Transcendental Deduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. iv + 318. Hardback, $80.00.Alison Laywine's contribution to the rich literature on Kant's "Transcendental Deduction of the Categories" stands out for the novelty of its approach and conclusions. Laywine's declared "strategy" is "to compare and contrast" the Deduction with the Duisburg Nachlaß, an important set of manuscript jottings from the 1770s (...) (10). But her approach is also deeply informed by Kant's writings on metaphysics from the 1750s and 1760s; moreover, she gives attention to ancient Greek geometry and its importance for Kant's thought.I believe Laywine's most important interpretative claim is that the Transcendental Deduction's "final step" addresses "the question of how nature is possible" (210). Here, 'nature' is understood in what Kant calls the "formal sense," as "the totality of rules under which appearances must stand if they are to be thought as joined in one experience" (Prolegomena, §36; cf. B 165). This constitutes a novel answer to the problem posed in Dieter Henrich's landmark 1969 paper "The Proof Structure of the Transcendental Deduction" (Review of Metaphysics 22 [1969]: 640–59): how to understand §§21–26 of the (B-edition) Deduction as proving more than the thesis already stated in §20 (that the manifold in an intuition necessarily stands under the categories).Crucial support for Laywine's interpretation comes from §26 of the Deduction, which claims the possibility of cognizing objects "a priori through categories... as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making [nature] possible," is now "to be explained" (B 159). Kant does not use the term 'world' in this passage (as he does in Prolegomena §36). But Laywine contends that here the word 'nature' "has unmistakable, deliberate, cosmological connotations," and in fact "means 'world' in the sense of Kant's early cosmology": roughly, a whole unified by means of laws (12–13).The "cosmological" language of §26 does not recur in the following, officially concluding, section of the Deduction. So, we might ask whether Kant's explanation of how the understanding prescribes laws to nature is integral to the Deduction; Henry Allison, for instance, describes this explanation as an "appendix" (Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical-Historical Commentary [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015], 9). The question of whether it belongs integrally has bite because, as Laywine makes clear in her "Conclusion," the universal laws at issue are just the Analogies of Experience. Thus, the passage could be read as the "promissory note with a forward-looking reference to the System of Principles" that she finds missing from the Deduction (289). Laywine meets such worries by arguing that "the reappropriation [from the pre-Critical period] of the general cosmology is actually [End Page 162] doing... a lot of hard work" in the Deduction (13). This sustained argument comes to a head in chapter 4, which contends that each of the two steps into which Laywine divides the first half of the (B-edition) Deduction, treated in chapters 2 and 3 (respectively), relies on cosmological presuppositions.Chapter 2 analyzes the conception of knowledge as relation to an object that is asserted (in §17) to rely on the synthetic unity of apperception. Laywine traces this conception to the Duisburg Nachlaß's account of "exposition," which relates concepts a priori to appearances, in something like the way that geometrical construction relates them to pure intuition. (Laywine further connects the Latin term expositio to the Greek ekthesis, which expositio translates in the context of geometrical proof. She thereby gives the notion of ekthesis broader importance than does Jaakko Hintikka, who noted its relevance to Kant's philosophy of mathematics in "Kant on the Mathematical Method" [Monist 51 (1967): 352–75]. Laywine claims that Borelli's edition of Euclid could have been Kant's source for the term, but I doubt it was known to Kant and his contemporaries, since it is not among the editions cited by Christian Wolff; Commandino seems likelier to me. Chapter 2 is concerned to articulate the notion of... (shrink)

84 B. ζῆν τε οῐεται οὕτω δεῖν … καὶ… ἀϕικομένη ἀπάλλαττεσθαι. Surprise has been expressed at this nominative after οἲεται δεῖν. Cf. Magna Moralia II. xi. 31, οὐκοἲ ονται δεῖν αὐτοι ϕιλεῖν ἀλλ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνδεεστέρων οἲονται δεῖν αὐϒοῖ ϕιλεῖσθαι. Herodian Hist. I. X. 4, ῲήθη δεῖν μέϒα τι δράσας κατορθῶσαι. Isocrates ix. 30, οὐΧ ἠϒήσαϒο δεῖν χωρίον καταλαβὼν και τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἀσϕαλείᾀ καταστήσας περιιδειν.… Either such phrases were so common that οἲομαι δεῖν came to be thought of as (...) a single word, in which δεῖν did not count, or else this use comes from adding δεῖν superfluously to a primitive use of οἲομαι with an infinitive. It is of course common enough to say οἲομαι ϕιλεῖν in good Attic for ‘I think fit to love.’ I should prefer the latter hypothesis myself: οῐομαι is properly to ‘carry’ or ‘bear’ so οἲομαι ϕιλείν is ‘I propose to love,’ and then δεῖν was added, especially when οἲομαι had come to mean ‘I think.’ There is a good instance of the primitive use of οἲω in Odyss. xix. 312, ῶδʹἀνὰ θυμὸν οἲεται surely this is simply ‘it is borne in upon my mind,’ ‘je suis porté à croir’. Anyhow οἲομαι or ἡ ϒοῦμαι δειν may be followed by a nominativeand infinitive. (shrink)

1 Cf. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of Mind (London, 1968), Chapter 9; 'A Causal Theory of Knowledge' by Alvin I. Goldman, The Journal of Philosophy , Vol. LXIV, No. 12, June 22, 1967. A striking parallelism would appear to exist between 'the causal theory of knowledge' and the orthodox Stoic doctrine regarding the kataleptike phantasia . See, for example, Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos 7.248 (reprinted in Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta , edited by H. F. A. von Arnim, Leipzig, 1921, (...) Volume I, page 18, 59C): 'An apprehensive appearance is one which has been stamped and sealed by the actual, and in accordance with the actual thing itself, in such a way that it would not be produced by what is not (the) actual' (I am indebted for the wording of this somewhat controversial translation to my colleague Mr. M. B. Wallace). See the discussion and additional ref. (shrink)

Thesis--Fribourg. Cf. Das Schweizer Buch. Serie B. 1966.

The question of where, between theory and experiment, computer simulations (CSs) locate on the methodological map is one of the central questions in the epistemology of simulation (cf. Saam Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 48, 293–309, 2017). The two extremes on the map have them either be a kind of experiment in their own right (e.g. Barberousse et al. Synthese, 169, 557–574, 2009; Morgan 2002, 2003, Journal of Economic Methodology, 12(2), 317–329, 2005; Morrison Philosophical Studies, 143, 33–57, 2009; Morrison (...) 2015; Massimi and Bhimji Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 51, 71–81, 2015; Parker Synthese, 169, 483–496, 2009) or just an argument executed with the aid of a computer (e.g. Beisbart European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 2, 395–434, 2012; Beisbart and Norton International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 26, 403–422, 2012). There exist multiple versions of the first kind of position, whereas the latter is rather unified. I will argue that, while many claims about the ‘experimental’ status of CSs seem unjustified, there is a variant of the first position that seems preferable. In particular I will argue that while CSs respect the logic of (deductively valid) arguments, they neither agree with their pragmatics nor their epistemology. I will then lay out in what sense CSs can fruitfully be seen as experiments, and what features set them apart from traditional experiments nonetheless. I conclude that they should be seen as surrogate experiments, i.e. experiments executed consciously on the wrong kind of system, but with an exploitable connection to the system of interest. Finally, I contrast my view with that of Beisbart (European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 8, 171–204, 2018), according to which CSs are surrogates for experiments, arguing that this introduces an arbitrary split between CSs and other kinds of simulations. (shrink)

Voluntarism about beliefs is the view that persons can be free to choose their beliefs for non-epistemic (truth-related) reasons (cf. Williams 1973). One problem for belief voluntarism is that it can lead to Moore-paradoxality. The person might believe that -/- a.) there are also good epistemic reasons for her belief, or that b.) there are no epistemic reasons one way or the other, or that c.) there are good epistemic reasons against her belief. -/- If the person is aware of (...) the fact that she chose her belief for non-epistemic reasons, then she would believe one of the following three things (using "evidence" as a term for all kinds of epistemic reasons): -/- a.) I believe that p but not because of the good evidence in favour of it; b.) I believe that p but that has nothing to do with the evidence; c.) I believe that p but the evidence speaks against it. -/- We could add a fourth case in which the person suspends belief on the subject matter despite the evidence: -/- d.) The evidence supports "p" but I have no view on the matter. -/- All the different versions a-d are somehow Moore-paradoxical. They constitute different ways of mistrusting one's own belief (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, p.190). Given that one cannot, for conceptual reasons, mistrust one's beliefs, it follows that a person cannot be in one of the above predicaments described by a-d. Hence, voluntarism about beliefs is false, at least if we are dealing with cases in which the person is aware of the fact that she chose her belief for non-epistemic reasons. It won't help to focus on cases in which the person is not aware of that fact, either because she has forgotten the genesis of her belief or because the process of belief acquisition was unconscious. -/- Bas van Fraassen's conception of a stance (cf. van Fraassen 2002)-a mix of commitments, values, goals-gives us reason to rethink the possibility of voluntarism. Might we be free to choose our stances for non-epistemic reasons? I argue here that the answer is negative. First, it is not clear at all whether stances can be objects of choice, properly speaking. And: Can we make sense of the idea of a free choice here? Furthermore, I argue that similar problems of Moore-paradoxality would arise for voluntarism about stances. If one does not want to completely devalue the idea of a stance, one should avoid voluntarism. (shrink)

Imagine that, through no fault of your own, you nd yourself at the bottom of a deep well. Thugs have picked up an innocent person | call him Bob | and have thrown him down the well. Bob is now falling towards you. If you do nothing, your body will cushion Bob's otherwise lethal fall. This will guarantee his survival, but it will kill you. If you shoot your ray gun, you vaporize and kill Bob, thereby saving your life. Are (...) you morally permitted to shoot your ray gun?Most people believe that self-defence against an innocent threat such as Bob is permissible. Judith Thomson (1991) and Frances Kamm (1987) have tried to justify this widely held belief. Jeff McMahan (2002) and Michael Otsuka (1994) have argued against it. In this paper, I contend that arguments from both sides of the debate mistakenly take the existence of an important asymmetry between Bob and you for granted. That way, they miss how similar Bob and you are, in that both of you happen to nd yourselves, undeservingly and through no fault of your own, in a situation in which you can secure your own survival only if you kill an innocent person. In this paper, I argue that despite certain differences, we are justi ed in focusing on the simliarities between Bob and you, and that you should thus flip a coin to decide who should live (cf. Broome, 1991). By flipping a coin, you ensure that an indivisible good -- continuing one's life -- is distributed as fairly as is possible without wasting it. (shrink)

For horribilesque we need something better than Haupt's horribile aequor ; and Mr. E. L. B. Meurig Davies comes near the truth, I think, with his proposal horribilem niue. A noun in the ablative indicating cold to define horribilem is just what we require. That noun does not seem to me, however, likely to be niue. Read rather horribilem gelu; cf. Luc. 2. 570 ‘ Rheni gelidis … fugit ab undis’, Claud. Rapt. 3. 321 ‘non Rheni glacies, non me Rhipaea (...) tenebunt’, Paneg. 7. 6 ‘duratus gelu Rhenus’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander. Vol. II. Commentary on Books IV–VPhilip A. StadterBosworth, A. B. A Historical Commentary on Arrian’s History of Alexander. Vol. II. Commentary on Books IV–V. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.In books 1–3, Arrian’s Alexander rushed from the Hellespont to Babylon, Susa, and Persepolis. In books IV and V the story changes: Alexander finds himself on the frontier, and beyond. No longer is (...) he confronting the enormous armies of the Persian king in set battles, but pushing beyond the frontiers of empire, seizing impregnable heights, and most important, struggling with his own Macedonians while defining himself.Bosworth, continuing his commentary after a fifteen-year interval, brings an exceptional background of historical, source critical, and literary studies. B. notes that his evaluation is “perhaps more sympathetic” than in his first volume, in part because the quality of the work “improves as it progresses” (v). The thoroughness [End Page 140] of the discussion (360 pages on the two books) is justified by the importance and complexity of the material. The reader is well served by an excellent subject index, a Greek index, ten maps, and four figures. An appendix on Nearchus suggests that that author may have reported much more than the journey from the Indus to the Persian Gulf found in the Indike, and may be a significant source for Arrian in the last four books of the Alexander history. Like the first volume, the commentary has Greek lemmata, translated only when there is a specific difficulty, but even Greekless readers can use it with the help of Brunt’s new Loeb text.Although the commentary deals frequently with textual questions, it focuses on elucidating the historical, geographical, stylistic, and interpretative problems of the text. B. ably notes the constant verbal reminiscences of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, especially in the more elaborate passages, e.g., the speeches at the Hyphasis. Still more are undoubtedly to be found, such as the echo of Thucydides (1.110.1, 3.112.8, 87.87.6) in 5.27.6, ¹l¼goi ¨k poll©n. His elucidation of Arrian’s use of Megasthenes, Nearchus, and Eratosthenes in the digressions at the beginning of book 5 is a model of clarity and precision. Here as elsewhere he stresses Arrian’s purposeful blending of his sources: e.g., on 5.6.3–8: “It is an elaborately contrived passage, and the source material is carefully selected to fit the scheme of the argument. Arrian is not merely rewriting a passage of Eratosthenes.” Throughout, his comments on sources are precise and thoughtful.B.’s notes follow wherever the text leads, but he devotes special attention to the major focuses of Arrian’s attention: the great digression on Alexander’s orientalism, the murder of Cleitus, proskunesis, and the page’s conspiracy (4.7.4–14.4 5 45–101), the march to the Indus, with the siege of Massaga and the capture of Aornus (4.22.3–30.9 5 141–96), the series of digressions which begin book 5, (5.1.1–8.1 5 197–259), the battle on the Hydaspes against Porus (5.8.4–19.4 5 262–311), and the mutiny on the Hyphasis (5.24.8–29.5 5 337–60).Bosworth’s commentary on book 5 encompasses the multiple levels of the narrative: the reworking of Eratosthenes, Megasthenes, and Nearchus in the preliminary section; the topographical and tactical problems of the battle with Porus, and the rhetorical and stylistic subtleties of the debate at the Hyphasis. Throughout the book, Arrian shows Alexander going beyond his predecessors. By crossing the Indus he passes the limits of the Persian Empire. At Nysa he surpasses the mythical conquests of Dionysus (5.2.1). The digression on the Indus bridges recalls the bridges (and defeats) of Xerxes and Darius, as well as Roman imperial engineering (5.7.1–2). The crossing of the Hydaspes and great battle contrast with Cyrus’ disastrous battle with the Massagetae in Herodotus 1.204–14 (cf. 5.4.5). The description of the river systems of the Punjab (5.4.1–2) evokes Herodotus’ account... (shrink)

We investigate whether classical combinatorial theorems are provable in ZF. Some statements are not provable in ZF, but they are equivalent within ZF. For example, the following statements (i)–(iii) are equivalent: $$cf({\omega }_1)={\omega }_1$$ c f ( ω 1 ) = ω 1, $${\omega }_1\rightarrow ({\omega }_1,{\omega }+1)^2$$ ω 1 → ( ω 1, ω + 1 ) 2, any family $$\mathcal {A}\subset [{On}]^{<{\omega }}$$ A ⊂ [ On ] < ω of size $${\omega }_1$$ ω 1 contains a $$\Delta (...) $$ Δ -system of size $${\omega }_1$$ ω 1. Some classical results cannot be proven in ZF alone; however, we can establish weaker versions of these statements within the framework of ZF, such as $${{\omega }_2}\rightarrow ({\omega }_1,{\omega }+1)$$ ω 2 → ( ω 1, ω + 1 ), any family $$\mathcal {A}\subset [{On}]^{<{\omega }}$$ A ⊂ [ On ] < ω of size $${\omega }_2$$ ω 2 contains a $$\Delta $$ Δ -system of size $${\omega }_1$$ ω 1. Some statements can be proven in ZF using purely combinatorial arguments, such as: given a set mapping $$F:{\omega }_1\rightarrow {[{\omega }_1]}^{<{\omega }}$$ F : ω 1 → [ ω 1 ] < ω, the set $${\omega }_1$$ ω 1 has a partition into $${\omega }$$ ω -many F-free sets. Other statements can be proven in ZF by employing certain methods of absoluteness, for example: given a set mapping $$F:{\omega }_1\rightarrow {[{\omega }_1]}^{<{\omega }}$$ F : ω 1 → [ ω 1 ] < ω, there is an F-free set of size $${\omega }_1$$ ω 1, for each $$n\in {\omega }$$ n ∈ ω, every family $$\mathcal {A}\subset {[{\omega }_1]}^{{\omega }}$$ A ⊂ [ ω 1 ] ω with $$|A\cap B|\le n$$ | A ∩ B | ≤ n for $$\{A,B\}\in {[\mathcal {A}]}^{2}$$ { A, B } ∈ [ A ] 2 has property B. In contrast to statement (5), we show that the following ZFC theorem of Komjáth is not provable from ZF + $$cf({\omega }_1)={\omega }_1$$ c f ( ω 1 ) = ω 1 : (6$$ ^*$$ ∗ ) every family $$\mathcal {A}\subset {[{\omega }_1]}^{{\omega }}$$ A ⊂ [ ω 1 ] ω with $$|A\cap B|\le 1$$ | A ∩ B | ≤ 1 for $$\{A,B\}\in {[\mathcal {A}]}^{2}$$ { A, B } ∈ [ A ] 2 is essentially disjoint. A function f is a uniform denumeration on$${\omega }_1$$ ω 1 iff $${\text {dom}}(f)={\omega }_1$$ dom ( f ) = ω 1, and for every $$1\le {\alpha }<{\omega }_1$$ 1 ≤ α < ω 1, $$f({\alpha })$$ f ( α ) is a function from $${\omega }$$ ω onto $${\alpha }$$ α. It is easy to see that the existence of a uniform denumeration of $${\omega }_1$$ ω 1 implies $$cf({\omega }_1)={\omega }_1$$ c f ( ω 1 ) = ω 1. We prove that the failure of the reverse implication is equiconsistent with the existence of an inaccessible cardinal. (shrink)

We answer a question of Cummings and Magidor by proving that the P-ideal dichotomy of Todorčević refutes ${\square}_{\kappa, \omega}$ for any uncountable $\kappa$. We also show that the P-ideal dichotomy implies the failure of ${\square}_{\kappa, < \mathfrak{b}}$ provided that $cf(\kappa) > {\omega}_{1}$.

Cistifero was the reading of A and B, but for want of a satisfactory interpretation of it, or indeed any evidence for it, cistibero has been preferred. Hirschfeld, who first brought this forward , explained it as meaning one of the ‘quinqueuiri cis Tiberim,’ a low official contrasting effectively with the senator of Gellia's dreams. It seems worth while to call attention to the Abstrusa gloss ,‘Vicorum et cistifer nomina sunt metallorum’ There seems to be no doubt that the first (...) word should be uiocurus ; and in theNotae Tironianae uiocurus and cistifer stand thus in succession at the end ofa list of officials. Heraeus thinks the author of the gloss must have confused the words with cistophorus and uictoriatus; but would he be likely to write metallorum for ‘coins’ ? For this last word in the gloss magistratuum has been proposed, a somewhat violent change even in a glossary. I suggest metatorum; cf.Abstr. 116, 17,‘Metatores: mansionum praeparatores.’ Was cistifer perhaps the title of a low-grade official who had something to do on the staff of a quartermaster? (shrink)

The theory of causal Bayes nets [15, 19] is, from an empirical point of view, currently one of the most promising approaches to causation on the market. There are, however, counterexamples to its core axiom, the causal Markov condition. Probably the most serious of these counterexamples are EPR/B experiments in quantum mechanics (cf. [13, 23]). However, these are also the only counterexamples yet known from the quantum realm. One might therefore wonder whether they are the only phenomena in the quantum (...) realm that create problems for causal Bayes nets. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that not only the phenomenon of quantum correlations in EPR/B experiments create problems for causal Bayes nets, but also the temporal evolution of quantum systems, which is described as dualistic by quantum mechanics. For this purpose, it is shown that single photon experiments in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) violate the causal Markov condition as well. It is then argued, however, that the Markov violation does not occur under the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation of Bohmian mechanics. (shrink)

Woods et al. (2015) claim that secular Simple Reaction Time (SRT) slowing (Woodley et al. 2013), disappears once modern studies are corrected for software and hardware lag, and once Galton’s data are corrected for fastest-response selection. Here, this is challenged with a reanalysis of the secular slowing of SRT in the UK amongst large (N>500), population-representative age-matched (≊18-30 years) studies. Starting with Galton’s sample, this is assigned the simulated value estimated by Dodonova and Dodonov (2013, who like Woods et al. (...) were critical of secular SRT slowing, owing to measurement issues) on the basis that he collected the fastest of three trials (207.5ms). The two sexes in Galton’s study are combined (as in Woods et al.), raising the weighted sample mean to 208.5ms. Next is the Wilkinson and Alison (1989) study, which attempted to replicate Galton’s study one century later, collecting SRTs as part of an exhibit in the London Science Museum. An electronic chronoscope recorded SRTs on magnetic tape, and sampled over eight trials with micro-processor-determined variable foreperiods. The mean SRT value for the 1,189 participants aged between 20 and 29 is 245ms. The presence of long and variable foreperiods necessitates a penalty of 10ms (Dodonova & Dodonov, 2013). Another 10ms should be deducted based on key-pressing time (Dodonova & Dodonov, 2013), reducing the mean to 225ms. The studies of Deary and Der (2005) and Der and Deary (2006) are also included. The first utilized the highly representative Scottish Twenty-07 cohort. Dodonova and Dodonov (2013) identified a 53ms lag stemming from liquid crystal stimulus onset delay. This is subtracted from the weighted average of the two sexes (300.8ms), along with another 10ms for key-pressing time. The resultant mean is 237.8ms.Dodonova and Dodonov (2013) cleaned the male data in the Der and Deary (2006) study, collected from the representative UK Health and Lifestyle Survey, by removing cases for which SRT standard deviations exceeded those for choice RT. This reduced the N from 834 to 661, and also reduced the mean from 300ms to 284ms. The estimate was also penalized for LCD onset delay and key-pressing time, reducing the mean to 221ms. When the SRT value for the female sample is penalized equivalently the resulting value is 239ms. In order to simulate the female N for the purposes of taking a weighted average of both sexes, the actual female N is reduced in proportion to the male N (79.3%=881), yielding a weighted mean of 230.9ms for a combined sample-size of 1,472. Table 1 presents the data used in the analysis.Table 1 SRT means, sample sizes and sampling years for four large, age-matched UK samples[Table 1 here]Consistent with Dodonova and Dodonov (2013), N-weighted regression is employed, as the only data on sample variability is sample size. Figure 1 illustrating the secular trend in UK SRT over 100 years.[Figure 1 here] Figure 1. Secular SRT slowing across four large, representative studies from the UK spanning a century. Bubble-size is proportional to sample size. Combined N=6,622. The secular slowing between UK studies is statistically significant (β=0.97; 95% CI=0.969 to 0.971, N=6,622), at –22.8ms a century. Additional evidence for generational SRT slowing comes from Verhaeghen (2014), who suggested that the ratio of longitudinal to cross-sectional age-related slowing might tentatively infer generational changes in processing speed. Verhaeghen reports ratios for two SRT studies (0.91 and 1.15), implying both secular losses and gains. For the study of Deary and Der (2005), the SRT ratios are “censored because they were excessively large” (p. 256). In this study, the ratio of the cross-sectional slowing trend (taking the weighted average of all paired between-cohort differences rescaled in terms of change per decade for males and females), to the weighted average decadal longitudinal slowing trend for both the males and females is 0.73, for an N of 1,926 (cf. Woodley et al., 2014b, for a detailed reanalysis of this dataset). The weighted average of the three SRT ‘Verhaeghen ratios’ is 0.9 (N=4,078) – tentatively consistent with generational declines (i.e. a ratio of <1). In conclusion Woods et al. (2015) have undoubtedly made an important contribution to the debate concerning the role of software and hardware lag in the inflation of contemporary estimates of SRT, however the evidence for generational SRT slowing remains quite compelling. ReferencesDeary, I.J., & Der, G. (2005). Reaction time, age, and cognitive ability: Longitudinal findings from age 16 to 63 years in representative population samples. Aging, Neuropsychology, and Cognition, 12, 187–213.Der, G., & Deary, I.J. (2006). Age and sex differences in reaction time in adulthood: Results from the United Kingdom Health Lifestyle Survey. Psychology and Aging, 21, 62–73.Dodonova, Y.A., & Dodonov, Y.S. (2013). Is there any evidence of historical slowing of reaction time? No, unless we compare apples and oranges. Intelligence, 41, 674–687.Galton, F. (1890). Exhibition of instruments (1) for testing the perception of differences of tint, and (2) for determining reaction-time. Journal of the Anthropological Institute, 19, 27–29.Verhaeghen, P. (2014). The elements of cognitive aging: Meta-analyses of age-related differences in processing speed and their consequences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Wilkinson, R.T., & Allison, S. (1989). Age and simple reaction time: Decade differences for 5,324 subjects. Journal of Gerontology, 44, 29–35.Woodley, M.A., Madison, G., & Charlton, B.G. (2014b). Possible dysgenic trends insimple visual reaction time performance in the Scottish Twenty-07 cohort: Areanalysis of Deary & Der (2005). Mankind Quarterly, 55, 110-124.Woodley, M.A., te Nijenhuis, J., & Murphy, R. (2013). Were the Victorians cleverer than us? The decline in general intelligence estimated from a meta-analysis of the slowing of simple reaction time. Intelligence, 41, 843–850.Woods, D.L., Wyma, J.M., Yund, E.W., Herron, T.J., & Reed, B. (2015). Factors influencing the latency of simple reaction time. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 9:131. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 272-273 [Access article in PDF] Matthew of Orléans. Sophistaria sive summa communium distinctionum circa sophismata accidentium. Edited by Joke Spruyt. Leiden: Brill, 2001. Pp. ix + 581. Cloth, $151.00. Matthew of Orléans is not a famous author (indeed, even his name is given tentatively by the editor on the basis of the explicit of one manuscript). And the Sophistaria was apparently (...) not one the most influential works of its time, the early thirteenth century (its full text is preserved only in a couple of manuscripts, and it has never been printed before). Yet, the Sophistaria of Matthew of Orléans is a fine example of a characteristic genre in the rich tradition of medieval logical literature. The genre itself is an interesting combination of two other characteristic genres: treatises on syncategoremata and sophismata. The sophismata treatises are discussions of problem-sentences (sophismata) usually grouped together to illustrate some logical doctrinal points, especially concerning the resolution of ambiguities caused by the logical behavior of syncategorematic terms in various contexts. The treatises on syncategoremata provide systematic discussions of the logical behavior of syncategorematic words, i.e., logical connectives, themselves. But these treatises also illustrate their doctrinal points by resolving the ambiguities of sophismata, mostly using some commonly accepted distinctions concerning how the function of the syncategoremata is to be construed in the contexts provided by these problem-sentences. The proper subject matter of the sophistaria treatises is the discussion of these common distinctions, dealing especially with ambiguities caused by (what we would describe as) the different possible scopes of the syncategoremata occurring in the paradigmatic sophismata.For example, take the sentence "Someone seeing nothing is someone seeing something." This sentence can be regarded as ambiguous, if we analyze "nothing" into "not... a thing," yielding (1) "Someone not seeing a thing is someone seeing something," which can be taken to be ambiguous between (a) "Someone not seeing anything is someone seeing something" and (b) "Someone not seeing something is someone seeing something," depending on whether we take "not" in (1) to be operating (a) on "seeing a thing," or (b) only on "seeing." On this analysis, the ambiguous sentence is obviously false in the first sense, but may be true in the second, for it may be true of Socrates who does not see Plato but sees Coriscus.To be sure, this is not the only possible way to account for the (genuine or putative) ambiguity of the original sentence. In fact, this is not the account considered by Matthew of Orléans or in a parallel passage by Peter of Spain in their analyses of the corresponding Latin sentence (Nihil videns est aliquid videns), although one of the arguments for the truth of the sophisma they reject would be a good argument for the second reading provided here (cf. Peter of Spain, Tractatus [Van Gorcum: Assen, 1972], 220, ll. 10-6, and Sophistaria, 88, ll. 16-20). In any case, the point of the sophistaria treatises is precisely the discussion of the merits and demerits of such possible accounts.The Sophistaria of Matthew of Orléans is a well-organized, highly structured treatise, divided into eight chapters, corresponding to the eight groups of syncategorematic terms [End Page 272] it deals with. The first chapter is devoted to the discussion of common distinctions concerning negations (both propositional and term-negations, including privative negation), the second deals with exclusive words (such as "only"), the third with exceptive words ("besides," "except," "unless"), the fourth with the conditional sign "if," the fifth with the modalities "necessarily" and "contingently," the sixth with the verbs "begins" and "ceases," the seventh with the word "whether," and the eighth with the distributive sign "every," that is, the universal sign that causes the terms it is construed with to be distributed for everything that falls under it.The discussion of these topics in the individual chapters is organized around typical scholastic questions raised concerning the validity of some common distinction in connection with typical sophismata, involving ambiguities in the operation... (shrink)

The following investigation illustrates, by concrete historical examples, some of the basic results, outlined in earlier papers on theory evolution and reference dynamics in science (cf. Balzer, W. et al.: 1989, 'A Static Theory of Reference in Science', Synthese 79, 319-360; Lauth, B.: 1989, 'Reference Problems in Stoichiometry', Erkenntnis 30, 339-362; Lauth, B.: 1990, 'Theory Evolution and Reference Kinematics', Synthese 88, 279-307). All theories considered in this paper are represented within a metatheoretical frame that has become known as the structuralist (...) view in the philosophy of science. The paper focusses on some physical constants, namely the mass and charge of electrons, henceforth denoted by m₀ and e₀, of Boltzmann's constant k, Faraday's constant F and Avogadro's Number ${\rm N}_{{\rm A}}$ , and the evolution of their 'reference spectra' from the beginning of the 19th century until the early days of quantum physics. (shrink)

In this short note I would like to reflect again upon paragraphs 39–40 of Epicurus’ Letter to Herodotus and, more specifically, on the text printed in the last critical edition by Tiziano Dorandi, which I quote below together with the critical apparatus :495 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐστι · σώματα μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔστιν, αὐτὴ ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶπάντων μαρτυρεῖ, καθ’ ἣν ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἄδηλον τῷλογισμῷ τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὥσπερ προεῖπον. [40] τόπος δὲ εἰ500 μὴ ἦν ὃ κενὸν καὶ χώραν καὶ ἀναφῆ (...) φύσιν ὀνομάζομεν, οὐκἂν εἶχε τὰ σώματα ὅπου ἦν οὐδὲ δι’ οὗ ἐκινεῖτο, καθάπερφαίνεται κινούμενα.495–496 de scholiis glossematibusque in tribus Epicuri epistulis et in RS i, vid. Dorandi, Epicuro 277–8 496–497 σώματα καὶ κενόν duce Gass. suppl. V. d. Muehll: σώματα καὶ τόπος Us. Traditam lectionem defendere conatur Arndt 26. Vid. K. Algra, Elenchos 15 100 et D. Obbink, Philodemus On Piety. Part 1 338–9 497 σώματα ΦFP4: σώμα· τὰ BP1498 πάντων om. Φ 499 τόπος δὲ Us.: τὸ πρόσθε B1: τὸ πρόσθεν B2PΦ: πρόσθεν F Cf. Lucr. 1.426–7 et vid. Sedley, Phronesis 183–4 εἰ δὲ Φ 500 ὃ Φ: ὃ* B2: ὃν B1, ut vid.: ὂν PF ὃ post κενὸν traiecit Φ προεῖπον τὸ πρόσθεν· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἦν ὃ κενὸν Brieger, Seele 5 Vid. Dorandi, Epicuro 282–4 501 ἦν B: εἴη ΦFP4: ἔνι P1 502 οὐδ’ Us.: οὔτε B2PF: ὅτε B1503 περιληπτικῶς rec. (shrink)

The title of this paper represents a "trick question" of the sort an interlocutor might employ to solicit an answer which, if framed with specific regard to the question's implicatures, cannot fail to confirm that interlocutor's position or further his aims. The best-known query of this form is the cliched "Do you still beat your spouse?" To escape being trapped, the respondent must either (a) avoid answering or (b) point out and refute the implication(s) embedded in the question itself. In (...) practice, both options typically entail risk. Option (a) may violate the procedural form of the "language game" (cf. Wittgenstein, 1963) within which the question occurs, while option (b) may violate the thematic or orientational focus presumed or enacted in that language game. This paper is intended to outline a "trick question" (that of the title) which has over the years been a recurrent challenge slung at adherents of the theories which have brought us together here in Belo Horizonte. If the following text accomplishes my intentions, it will explain the challenge, assess our response(s) to date, and offer suggestions about what (if any) further action it may prudently motivate. (shrink)

Motivated by recent results and questions of Raghavan and Shelah, we present ZFC theorems on the bounding and various almost disjointness numbers, as well as on reaping and dominating families on uncountable, regular cardinals. We show that if $\kappa =\lambda ^+$ for some $\lambda \geq \omega $ and $\mathfrak {b}=\kappa ^+$ then $\mathfrak {a}_e=\mathfrak {a}_p=\kappa ^+$. If, additionally, $2^{<\lambda }=\lambda $ then $\mathfrak {a}_g=\kappa ^+$ as well. Furthermore, we prove a variety of new bounds for $\mathfrak {d}$ in terms of (...) $\mathfrak {r}$, including $\mathfrak {d}\leq \mathfrak {r}_\sigma \leq \operatorname {\mathrm {cf}}]^\omega )$, and $\mathfrak {d}\leq \mathfrak {r}$ whenever $\mathfrak {r}<\mathfrak {b}^{+\kappa }$ or $\operatorname {\mathrm {cf}})\leq \kappa $ holds. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE HOLINESS OF THE CHURCH IN LUMEN GENTIUM HE NOTION OF the Church as a smner, not often spoken of in Catholic theology of other times, has become quite common in recent years.1 Among the questions of a pastoral and theological nature that have given rise to it, the following may be noted: a) The ecumenical question. Many would wish the Church as such to accuse herself of sin, (...) as a means towards reconciliation. b) The idea borrowed from traditional Protestant theology of a certain compatibility between sin and holiness,2 the simul sanctus et pecca.tor of Luther. c) The notion of evil as a mere deficiency properly belonging to a given stage of development of the Cosmos; such is t:he understanding of Teilhard de Chardin.3 1 The mark of holiness has been applied to the Church more than any of the other three, from the very beginning of Christian times; Baptismal creeds are a clear witness to this. 2 Cf. n. 66 on Kiing. 3 "What is the inevitable complement of anything which results from such a process (an evolutive one) but having to pay the price of some losses? Lack of harmony and physical decomposition in the Pre-Vivant, suffering in the Vivant, sin in the dominion of Freedom..." (Comment je crois) ; "We must say that God, in spite of his power, cannot unite any creature to himself without necessarily entering into battle with Evil, because Evil appears inevitably with the first atom of being which creation 'releases' into existence. Creation and sinlessness are terms as much at loggerheads with divine Power and Wisdom as creature with unicity" (Notes sur les modes de l'ac-tion divine dans l'Universe-yr. 1920). Undoubtedly, sin in its effects is a lack of what man (and creation dependent on him) should have, but the point that Teilhard misses is that the 'deficiency' due to sin (unlike other imperfections found in creation) is due to the responsible action of human beings, and has no inevitability about it. 673 674 PAUL o'cALLAGHAN d) An increased awareness of the social dimension of sm. Undoubtedly sin has numerous (though divisive) social efects.4 But it would be incorrect to affirm that sin is an entirely social phenomenon.5 An application of such a notion to the Church would be an easy next stage. e) A certain undoing of the constrast between the ' Kingdom of God' and the 'world ',6 to the detriment, let it be said, both of the eternity and definitiveness of the former, and the progressive sanctification of the latter. The Church then, not belonging so intimately to the All-Holy, may be more easily looked upon as a sinner. f) Another factor has been the positive humanizing em4 In the Apostolic Exhortation Reeonciliatio et Paenitentia (English translation ; London: CTS, 1984) where Pope John Paul II ga.thers together the findings of the 1983 Synod of Bishops, many acceptable ways of understanding ' social sin' are explained: as mystically ' dragging down ' the whole world; in the sense that it goes in the detriment of our neighbour; in the relationships between various human communities (n.16: p. 51-54). 5 For example, the following words of G. Gutierrez: "No se trata, en la perspectiva liberadora, de! pecado como realidad individual, privada e intimista, afirmada justo lo necesario para necesitar una redenci6n 'espiritual ', que no cuestiona el orclen en que vivimos. Se trata del pecado como un hecho social, hist6rico... El pecatlo se da en estructures opresoras en la explotaci6n del hombre por el hombre, en la dominaci6n y esclavitud de los pueblos, razas y clases sociales. El pecado surge, entonces, como la alienaci6n fundamental, como la rniz de una situaci6n de injusticia y explotaci6n" Teofogia de la liberaci6n (Salamana: Sigueme, 1972), p. 236-237. And in a more recent work of his: " pecar es optar por la opresi6n y contra la liberaci6n " La fuerza hist6rioa de los pobres, (Lima, 1979) p. 19. As J. M. IbaiiezLanglois points out, this statement would be fine if it were to say 'to opt for oppression and against liberation is sinful', that is one more among many possible sins: Teologia de la liberacion... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Fifth Stasimon of Euripides' MedeaCharles SegalAmong the lyrics of extant Greek tragedy several passages of Euripides are remarkable for the effects of pathos achieved by introducing children. In Alcestis the children of the protagonists appear unexpectedly on the stage and sing a strophic lament over their dead mother, punctuated by two trimeters of Admetus sharing their grief (392-415). Suppliants presents an even longer and more complex choral (...) lament as Euadne's now orphaned children join with the chorus in a commatic, antiphonal thrēnos for their mother (1123-64).1 Their appearance not only adds to the sudden flurry of new characters when the play is already nearing its end (Euadne enters at 990 and her father Iphis at 1034) but also fills out the panorama of lament at the end of the play: children and a father lament over a mother and a daughter who chose a heroic death, and the Argive children, thanks to Theseus, can lament over the bodies of their slain warrior fathers (Supp. 1114-75). The parallelism helps emphasize the heroism of Euadne, one of several self-sacrificing women in these so-called political plays.Euripides obtains another kind of pathos by the offstage cries of Medea's children at the moment of their murder. In an initial strophe and antistrophe the chorus of Corinthian women expresses its horror at the imminent slaughter and speculates on its supernatural causes (an Erinys in the house, 1258-60) and also on its human motivations (Medea's [End Page 167] rage, 1265-67). There follows a cry from within the house, indicated by μοι, which a third century B.C. papyrus fragment has now restored to the text.2 In the ensuing exchange the chorus sings in dochmiacs while the children cry out in iambic trimeters from within the house (1270a-81):Child (within). Alas for me.Chorus. Do you hear, do you hear the children's shouting? Alas, miserable woman, ill-starred.Child A. Alas, what shall I do? Where shall I flee my mother's hands?Child B. I know not, dearest brother; for we are being destroyed.Chorus. Shall I enter the house? I am decided to ward off murder from the children.Child A. Yes, in the gods' name, help; for we stand in need.Child B. How close we are to the snares of the sword.Chorus. Wretched woman, truly then you are rock or iron, you who will kill with a doom from your own hands the fruit of children that you bore!The audience, we must recall, can have only a vague idea about how the children would die, for Euripides seems to be the first poet to [End Page 168] make Medea kill them intentionally.3 The chorus began their previous ode, the fourth stasimon, by abandoning hope for the children's lives (, 976-77: "Now no longer do I have any hope of the children's lives, no longer; for they are already going to their murder"). Despite Medea's impulses of love and pity in the celebrated speech of inner struggle that follows this ode (1040-80), we experience the increasing inevitability of the children's deaths, especially after the news of Creon's and the Princess' deaths (cf. 1236-41). In contrast to her earlier hesitation, when she addressed her thumos with a plea not to do the deed (1056), Medea now, just before the fifth stasimon, addresses heart and hand to steel themselves for the final step of her revenge. Although Medea is now irrevocably committed to the murder, her speech nevertheless marks another moment of deep tragic division between maternity and vengefulness (1244-50):4Come, my wretched hand, take the sword, take it, and go toward the painful goal of your life, and do not yield to cowardice or remember how dear are the children, how you gave them birth, but for this short day forget your children, and then utter your lament. For if you kill them, yet they are dear. Unfortunate woman that I am.5When the chorus, in the ode that follows these lines, prays to Earth and Helios, it brings us closer to a vision... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic InterpretationDavid SiderR.B. Rutherford. The Art of Plato: Ten Essays in Platonic Interpretation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: Duckworth, 1995. xv 1 335 pp. Cloth, $45.Richard Rutherford has given himself a difficult task: nothing less than a unified analysis of the form and content of several Platonic dialogues, without—as if this is not challenging enough—“losing sight either of his historical context (...) or [in a questionable disjunction] of the ethical, religious, and other themes which are central to his work” (viii). To those who think that the effort is not worth the candle because Plato’s worth as a philosopher is in no significant way enhanced by the literary trimmings, Rutherford wisely pays little attention, choosing rather to direct his book toward those among “academic and the general public” (viii) who (like this reviewer) are willing to believe that the message of a dialogue comprises more than the sum of its logical arguments.It will be seen that in my opinion Rutherford has largely succeeded, but in addition to the particular points raised below, two general criticisms can be made. The first is that by not demanding knowledge of Greek from his audience, Rutherford has cut himself off from what is often the most subtle, and hence the most telling, tool for analyzing the relation between form and content, namely the very language in which Plato has chosen to couch what may be at one and the same time both part of the argument and a more allusive framing element of his overall thesis. Well aware of this limitation, Rutherford does his best to mitigate [End Page 462] with occasional transliteration and explanation of the underlying Greek, but he clearly does not want to burden his Greekless reader with too much of this.A second general criticism is that Rutherford has not read (or reported on) too much of his fellow workers in the field of literary analysis of Plato. Nobody can be expected to have read everything written on Plato, but too many important articles have been omitted for Rutherford to claim that his book would not have been greatly improved had he spent more time on it (x). His wide reading of the philosophical side does not compensate for his not having worked his way through (at least) the Lustrum bibliographies of Cherniss and Brisson from 1950 to the near present.The ten chapters of this book (which cannot be treated in detail here) comprise two by way of introduction (“Problems and Approaches,” “Socratic Literature and the Socratic Question”) and, the heart of the book, eight which deal, in varying levels of detail, with twelve of the dialogues, five of them receiving a chapter each (Protagoras, Gorgias, Symposion, Republic, Phaidros). Much of the first two chapters contains matter not strictly relevant to the matter at hand, but even the section on Socratic literature other than Plato’s provides background with which to compare Plato’s treatment of the Socratic persona. They can confidently be recommended to students looking for an introduction to Plato’s writings fuller than that found in Guthrie but not as daunting as Friedlander’s first volume (which, however, is ultimately more satisfying). Especially praiseworthy are the sections devoted to the various historical problems and literary approaches to the dialogues. Further documentation, however, would alert the reader to alternate views. For example, Rutherford agrees with the majority of modern scholars (in opposition to all ancient views on the matter) that Plato did not write his dialogues before the death of Socrates; cf. L. Rossetti, “Logoi Socratikoi anteriori al 399 a.c.,” Logos e Logoi 9 (1991) 21–40, who reviews the evidence and concludes that, most likely, although Socrates’ dialogues were taken down for study (by others if not by Plato as well), it was not until the death of Socrates that people thought to publish them. One also misses any reference to the works of Paul Shorey in the section on the question of the unity versus the development of Plato’s thought (23–25).A more general criticism of the introduction is that several of the topics discussed are... (shrink)

For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...) not competing ones; the phrase has been used in at least two other senses, as by, respectively, Dretske (1993, 1995) and Block (1995).1 My definition is stipulative, but not brutely so; it settles on one thing that is often meant by conscious state cf. a conscious memory, a conscious desire, a conscious intention, a conscious decision. According to higher-order (HO) theories of consciousness in this sense of consciousness, what makes a mental state a conscious one is that it is represented by another of the subject’s mental states, that in virtue of which s/he is aware of it. Some practitioners follow Locke in taking the higher-order state to be quasi-perceptual (Armstrong, 1968, 1980, Lycan 1991, 1996); others say it may be merely a thought about the original state (Rosenthal, 1986, 1990).2 There is an alleged objection to such theories, that originated with Goldman (1993)Error: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMapError: Illegal entry in bfrange block in ToUnicode CMap3 and has since been voiced and discussed by others (Dretske 1995, Stubenberg 1998, Van Gulick 2000, 2005, Gennaro 2005, Kriegel 2009). I say alleged, because. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:364 BOOK REVIEWS opening of natural law into the Christian economy of salvation for which May argues. It should be noted that May displays an admirable openness to further development along these lines with his appreciation of some of the questions raised by Aurelio Ansaldo (see pp. 97-98, n. 135). In spite of some limitations, this is a significant work well-deserving of consideration by any student of moral theology. (...) It highlights the ongoing contribution of an authentic and well-grounded Thomism to current efforts toward the renewal of moral theology-a contribution also recommended by the Second Vatican Council (cf. Optatum Totius, n.16). The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. JOHN S. GRABOWSKI From Existence to God; A Contemporary Philosophical Argument. By BARRY MILLER. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. Pp. x +206. $42.50 (cloth). Can the existence of God be proved from the existence of any con· crete individual thing? Many religious thinkers-theists as well as atheists-might regard this as a vain project. The criticisms of Hume and Kant, as well as a certain suspicion of the validity of the principles of sufficient reason and intelligibility, appear to have demolished all grounds for such an argument. Many find no contradiction in affirming the existence of the whole universe while denying the existence of God. Barry Miller, on the contrary, does find a contradiction in affirming the existence of even one concrete individual unless the existence of God is also affirmed. His book is a sustained and intriguing attempt to show that contradiction. His argument is based not on the principles of sufficient reason or intelligibility, but strictly on the principle of non· contradiction (172-4). The concrete individual which serves as his starting point and remains his faithful companion throughout the book is a particular existing dog named " Fido," and the way to the existence of God begins with the simple question: " How ever can it be that Fido does exist? " Miller's first task is to establish that his question is not gratuitous by showing that Fido's existence is not a " brute fact" requiring no explanation. The argument given in chapters two and three shows that Fido's existence is very puzzling indeed, requiring conditions that are "apparently impossible to satisfy" (10). The argument begins with BOOK REVIEWS 365 the Fregean position that ontological categories are to he assigned in accordance with linguistic categories. (While Miller admits that this Fregean view is not the only legitimate one, he does not think that this limits the effectiveness of his argument [10, 87-88.]) Since the name "Fido" in the linguistic expression " Fido exists " is a complete expression, while the predicate " exists " is not (15, 23), Fido's existence is understood as " exemplifying two ontological categories, viz., a complete entity (Fido) and an incomplete entity (Fido's existence)" (Prop. 1.1, p. 10). It is then argued that "Fido's existing must he constructible conceptually from Fido and his existence" (Prop. 1.2, p. 10). This conceptual construction would he impossible, however, "if Fido were inconceivable except in terms of Fido's existing." The fact is, however, that Fido is inconceivable except in terms of Fido's existing : "Fido could neither he referred to nor conceived of before he existed" (Prop. 1.3, p. 11). Indeed, prior to its existing, "no concrete individual could be conceived of by anyone or in any way " (42). One is thus left with a dilemma that requires one conceptually to construct Fido's existing from Fido and Fido's existence, but prevents one from doing so since Fido is only conceivable in terms of Fido's existing. In chapter four and its appendix, Miller presents detailed arguments in response to C. J. F. Williams, B. Russell, W. V. Quine, and others to show that existence is a real property. He then goes on in chapter five to review the dilemma and to offer his solution. Fido's existing must he conceptually constructible from two ontological categories, "Fido" and "Fido's existence." But "Fido's existing" cannot he constructed from them since one of them, "Fido's existence," is not a complete entity and the other one... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Location of the Houses of Cicero and Clodius and the Porticus Catuli on the Palatine Hill in RomeSteven M. CeruttiThe location of cicero’s house on the Palatine hill in Rome is a matter of more than ordinary interest, inasmuch as he locates it for us in relation to a number of other important houses and buildings, and recent archaeological investigations at the southwest corner of the hill can (...) be used to throw fresh light on this question. Cicero’s house almost certainly stood along the higher leg of the Clivus Victoriae, along the northwest side of the hill running from the north corner to the precinct of the Magna Mater. Here it would have overlooked the Forum Romanum, as Cicero says in conspectu prope totius urbis (Dom. 100). 1 On one side it adjoined the Porticus Catuli, which Clodius enlarged by the addition of a part of Cicero’s property, but only a fraction (vix pars aedium mearum decima,Dom. 116), after destroying Cicero’s house during Cicero’s self-imposed exile in 58 B.C. However, since Cicero regarded his as a large and noble house (Dom. 115; cf. Har. Resp. 16, Fam. 6.18.5), that tenth might have been a not inconsiderable parcel. Furthermore, in De Haruspicum Responso (49) Cicero tells us that Clodius announced in public assembly that he wished to build on the Carinae on the Mons Oppius a second porticus quae Palatio responderet. In context he clearly means that Clodius hoped to drive Pompey into exile as he had Cicero, to destroy Pompey’s Domus Rostrata, and to use the land for the construction of a porticus, perhaps in conjunction with the Temple of Tellus that was located nearby, that would match the Porticus Catuli as he had rebuilt it. 2 This has been taken to mean that Cicero’s house on the Palatine faced the Carinae, but that is not necessarily the case, as before the removal of the Velia in the 1930s the view from the Palatine to the Carinae was not uninterrupted, and it is questionable whether any significant [End Page 417] part of the Carinae was in view of the Palatine. 3 But since we cannot bound the Carinae, the question must be left open.On another side Cicero’s house adjoined the house of Q. Seius Postumus, which Cicero seems to have thought architecturally in a class with his own (Dom. 115). Seius’ house, either on the opposite side or in back, adjoined that of P. Clodius Pulcher, for when Clodius wanted to enlarge his house by annexing that of Seius, and Seius was reluctant to part with his house, Clodius threatened to block his light, presumably by the construction of walls that would cover windows that let into open areas such as gardens in his own house. 4 Cicero’s house, when it was later rebuilt, also adjoined that of his brother Quintus, closely enough that Cicero says he and his brother would be contubernales, once his brother’s house was finished, and the adherents of Clodius set fire to the building in progress in November 57 while they were trying to discourage Cicero from rebuilding (Att. 4.3.2; QFr. 2.4.2, 2.5.3). From this it seems almost certain that Cicero must have ceded a slice of his plot to his brother when the time for rebuilding came. Space on the Palatine had long been expensive and difficult to obtain, and at that time Marcus Cicero was worried about his financial condition and complained that the indemnity awarded him by the Senate was woefully inadequate (Att. 4.2.5). One might also imagine that the brothers’ houses adjoined at the rear, facing on different streets, but given the space available between the two legs of the Clivus Victoriae and the Via Nova, that is less likely. 5Clodius’ object in acquiring the houses of Seius and Cicero, although in the case of the latter ostensibly to enlarge the Porticus Catuli and to build a temple of Libertas (Dom. 108), was actually, Cicero asserts, to enlarge his own house and to make it one of the most sumptuous residences in the... (shrink)

La deuxième partie de cette étude (cf. BCH 1984, p. 37-69) présente trois groupes de skyphoi de l'atelier de Chalcis, datant de la fin du Protogéométrique jusqu'au Sub-Proto- géométrique III : a) Les skyphoi avec un zigzag sur la lèvre, b) Les skyphoi aux demi-cercles suspendus, c) Les skyphoi monochromes. On y a ajouté les tessons de gobelets monochromes ou avec un zigzag sur la lèvre, de la même période. Étude des rapports entre Chalcis et Lefkandi. Analyse de l'importance du (...) dépôt de Chalcis dont proviennent ces skyphoi, et essai de reconstitution des premières relations commerciales, de l'art et de l'histoire d'une ville qui a joué un tel rôle dans le rayonnement de l'hellénisme au-delà des mers. (shrink)

Abstract Proportional quantifiers have played a central role in the development of formal semantics because they set a benchmark for the expressive power needed to describe quantification in natural language (Barwise and Cooper Linguist Philos 4:159–219, 1981). The proportional quantifier most, in particular, supplied the initial motivation for adopting Generalized Quantifier Theory (GQT) because its meaning is definable as a relation between sets of individuals, which are taken to be semantic primitives in GQT. This paper proposes an alternative analysis of (...) most that does not treat it as a lexical item whose meaning is accessible without the help of compositional processes. Instead, proportional most is analyzed as the superlative of many (cf. Bresnan Linguist Inq 4(3):274–344, 1973). Two types of empirical evidence are presented in support of this view, both exploiting the fact that only a decompositional analysis of proportional quantifiers provides the means to generate different logical forms for seemingly equivalent statements of the form most A B and more than half of the A B. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: -/- [99] JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 23:1 JANUARY 198 5 Book Reviews Kenneth Dorter. Plato's 'Phaedo': An Interpretation. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982. Pp. xi + 233. $28.50. Kenneth Dorter of the University of Guelph has given us a useful and unusual study of the Phaedo, which will attract the interest of a variety of Plato's readers. He provides the careful studies of the dialogue's (...) arguments for immortality to be expected in a sound commentary, paying close attention to the text as well as to recent scholarship, and displaying a good sense of argument. What gives the book additional interest, however, are its features as an interpretation of the Phaedo. Two stand out. First, Dorter wishes to give full weight not only to the logic of the arguments but also to the dramatic details of Plato's writing, believing these to be important in disclosing Plato's intentions. Secondly, he reads the Phaedo in light of a more general understanding of Plato's philosophy, especially the nature of the soul in its cosmic as well as individual aspects. Much of this is set out in a final speculative chapter, where Dorter seeks to make intelligible Plato's developing conception of soul by means of such notions as energy and poles of consciousness. Not every reader will be persuaded; but Dorter is to be commended for an attempt to move the discussion beyond the Phaedo and Plato's own vocabulary. The study gains its coherence from Dorter's belief that Plato's view of soul cannot support the ostensible aim of the dialogue, to provide reassurance of personal immortality. Although he has no doubt that for the Platonic Socrates there is "a meaningful sense in which we may be called immortal" (94, cf. 159), Dorter's analysis must be stretched to provide that sense. In part this is a result of his assessment of the arguments. The first, from reciprocity in nature, can at most show that, given the eternal nature of the world, soul and corporeality in general must continue to exist. The argument from recollection can point only to a non-empirical element in our knowledge ; that from the soul's kinship with the divine is best seen as an analogy developed to awaken within us a sense of eternity. The final argument, though containing fallacies (157), will support the conclusion that immortal soul is imperishable as long as soul is regarded as motive force in the universe, in the first argument's sense. In none of these discussions, then, can Plato's reasoning yield up personal survival. But there is another part to Dorter's case, underlying this conclusion. For Plato the individual human being is a composite of soul and body; so even if Plato were to prove the immortality of the soul he could never establish personal survival (63-64). It is not surprising then that Dorter is left with a doctrine of immortality either reduced to a "discovery of eternity within ourselves" (77), or else dissolved into a principle of enduring cosmic energy. So in neither case does it seem meaningful for Plato to say that we are immortal: the eternal which we sense is no more us than it is anything else. Although it is of course possible that Plato did not intend this consequence of his arguments, Dorter thinks otherwise. In support he invokes literary features of the dialogue to argue that Plato operates on one level for the less sophisticated (who wish to be persuaded of personal survival) and on another for the philosophically reflective reader. Dorter treats the textual evidence for this claim with an appropriate modesty, and tries to justify Plato's apparent duplicity as an attempt to convince the weak by a 'noble lie' (95-97). Nevertheless this leads Dorter to mix together too quickly for this reader popular religion, myth, and metaphor. To the fact that Plato does not espouse the language of popular religion literally, Dorter adds his own view of myth as an imaginative appeal to emotion that can be translated without loss into rational discourse (7, 165, a95). So the accounts of the afterlife at 8oc-84 b... (shrink)